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Abstract
The current study explored whether earned entitlement modulated the perception of fairness in three experiments. A
preliminary resource earning task was added before players decided how to allocate the resource they jointly earned.
Participants’ decision in allocation, their responses to equal or unequal offers, whether advantageous or
disadvantageous, and subjective ratings of fairness were all assessed in the current study. Behavioral results
revealed that participants proposed more generous offers and showed enhanced tolerance to disadvantageous
unequal offers from others when they performed worse than their presumed “partners,” while the reverse was true in
the better-performance condition. The subjective ratings also indicated the effect of earned entitlement, such that
worse performance was associated with higher perceived feelings of fairness for disadvantageous unequal offers,
while better performance was associated with higher feelings of fairness for advantageous unequal offers. Equal
offers were considered “fair” only when earned entitlement was even between two parties. In sum, the perception of
fairness is modulated by an integration of egalitarian motivation and entitlement. In addition to justice principles,
participants were also motivated by self-interest, such that participants placed more weight on entitlement in the
better-performance condition than in the worse-performance condition. These results imply that earned entitlement is
evaluated in a self-serving way.
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Introduction

approximately 20% (rather than nothing) of the windfall to
responders [10]. Such an egalitarian motivation appears in
human beings as early as 7-8 years old such that children
avoid both advantageous and disadvantageous inequality
when they decide how to distribute hedonic rewards (e.g.,
candy) between themselves and their partners [11]. In the UG,
the offer proposed by the proposer can be either accepted or
rejected by the responder. The money is split as proposed if
the offer is accepted, whereas both proposer and responder
receive zero following rejection [12]. In contrast to the standard
presumption of self-interest (i.e., that responders will accept
any positive offer), the rejection rate reaches 50% when the
offer is below 30% of the windfall [10]. Therefore, experimental

It is widely acknowledged that human behavior often
deviates from the goal of maximizing self-benefit during social
decision-making [1]. Substantial evidence from economics [2],
evolutionary biology [3,4], and social neuroscience [5–7] has
implicated other-regarding preference (i.e., fairness) in
resource allocation. Speficially, individuals’ perferences for
fairness have been revealed in two classical games: dictator
game (DG) and ultimate game (UG). For example, in the DG,
the dictator decides how to split a certain windfall between him/
herself and the receiver, who can only accept the dectator’s
decision [8,9]. In contrast to maximizing their own self-interest,
dictators show a preference for equality and offer
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evidence from both classical DG and UG has identified
egalitarian motivation in human beings [2].
However, individuals in the classical DG/UG task always
make “context-free” decisions, such that the resources for
allocation are “manna from heaven” [13]. Furthermore, the
fairness principle in these tasks is framed in its simplest form:
equality of outcomes. Though the simplicity inherent in these
classical forms of the DG/UG game was viewed favorably in
earlier studies, the same simplicity has been called into
question in recent years [14,15]. In particular, resource
allocation in the real world is typically based not on the windfall
profits, but rather on resources jointly earned. More
importantly, the egalitarian motivation revealed by classical
DG/UG task cannot reflect the pluralism of fairness principles in
the real world [16]. Fairness principles are heterogeneous
among individuals [17], and economic decisions from a single
person may also reflect the trade-off between multiple fairness
principles [18]. This view is supported by recent evidence that
fairness principles adopted by individuals are flexible across
contexts [19], such that individuals integrate both preferences
for equality and contextual cues (e.g., merit, expectation) to
form a context-specific fairness motivation for decision-making
[20]. In short, the simplicity of classical DG/UG task reduces
the ecological validity of these tasks and may lead to
inconsistency between individuals’ decisions in the laboratory
setting and in the real world [21,22].
To address these issues, an increasing number of studies
have added a production phase before the allocation phase
[23–28]. That is, the surplus allocated in the allocation phase is
earned from the production phase. This procedure provides a
promising way to measure distinct fairness principles by
manipulating performance in the allocation phase. The
performance manipulation leads to senses of asymmetry
between players regarding earned entitlement to the surplus
[25]. In this context, individuals show little preference for
equality, but rather allocate the surplus according to that sense
of entitlement [29]. That is, proposers who have earned the
entitlement on the surplus will allocate very little to their
opponents. Such a pinciple of earned entitlement has been well
established in previous studies regarding distributive justice
[17,30]. However, individuals may also take advantage of
performance manipulation to increase their payoffs (i.e., selfinterestes). In particular, individuals who earn higher
entitlement are more prone to take the factor of entitlement into
consideration during resource allocation; whereas entitlement
is much less weighted when individuals are at lower levels of
perceived entitlement [18,31].
Here, we replicated the modulations of earned entitlement on
individuals’ decisions in resource allocation and examined
whether entitlement would influence participants’ responses to
unequal offers. This study aimed to extend current literature on
distributive justice in the following aspects: Firstly, both DG and
UG tasks were used in the current study. Previous studies
predominately focused on how entitlement modulates resource
distribution (i.e., dictators’ decisions in the DG task), whereas
limited studies have reported effects of entitlement on
individuals’ responses to unequal offers (i.e., responders’ costly
punishment in the UG task). Individuals’ decisions in these two
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tasks are based on distinct cognitive fucntions: DG-dictators’
decisions are primarily linked to cognitive-control processes
[32,33]; whereas UG-responders’ decisions are closely
associated with affective responses [6,34,35] (but see 35,36.
Therefore, it remains unknown whether entitlement modulates
both types of decisions in a similar way. Secondly, participants
in this study played multiple rounds of DG/UG (Experiments 1
and 2). In this regard, the current study aimed to develop a
paradigm that could be directly combined with neuroimaging
techniques, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI). Most neuroimaging studies on fairness have been
conducted with classical DG/UG tasks [1]; thus, few
neuroimaging studies have investigated the modulations of
entitlement on preference for equality. However, participants
often play only one round in most previous behavioral studies
focusing on the entitlement aspect of distributive justice, and
this kind of one-round task is unsuitable for neuroimaging
studies. Importantly, individuals’ decisions in the multi-round
DG/UG task were confirmed with a further study consisting of
one-shot version of DG/UG (Experiment 3), so that the
consistency of participants’ decisions across ditinct versions of
DG/UG could be directly measured. Finally, participants’
subjective ratings of fairness in each condition were collected
in the current study. These subjective ratings, which can help
to the interpret underlying psychological mechanism of
economic decisions [34,37], have been ignored in most recent
studies.
In summary, the current study investigated whether and how
entitlement modulated individuals’ allocation decisions in the
DG/UG and their responses to unequal offers in the UG. We
added a resource-earning task before the stage of resource
distribution to manipulate levels of performance. According to
previous studies, participants would make their decisions
based on the interaction of egalitarian motivation, earned
entitlement, and self-interest (strategic motivation and selfserving bias) [38]. Egalitarian motivation entails that people will
always show preference for equality, irrespective of levels of
entitlement (see also 29. However, individuals may consider
both earned entitlement and preference for equality rather than
following one simple principle such as equal shares. In
particular, participants might allocate less surplus to
themselves and show more tolerance to unequal offers in the
worse-performance
condition
than
better-performance
condition and vice versa, even though these decisions would
lead to unequality between two players [17,30,39].
Furthermore, participants might act in a self-serving way to
increase their payoff, such that earned entitlement would be
emphasized to a larger extent when participants’ performance
was better, compared to the condition when participants’
perormance was worse [18,31]. Accordingly, the money units
that proposers allocate to themselves in the better-performance
condition would be more than the money units that proposers
would allocate to receipients in the worse-performance
condition. In the same vein, responders would accept more
advantageous unequal offers in the better-performance
condition compared with the acceptance rate of
disadvantageous unequal offers in the worse-performance
condition. Finally, the money units participants allocated to
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themselves were expected to be higher in the DG compared
with those allocated in the UG. This difference between UG
and DG would reflect individual’s strategic motivation in the
UG, given that the proposer of UG has to consider potential
sanction when making offers [33,40]. In summary, the
preference for equality might be modulated by both earned
entitlement and self-interest.

participant and “other” refers to the presumed partner). Each
participant was told that he/she and his/her partner would
together get a reward of 100 MUs if either of them made the
right choice in the task (“you-right, other-right”, “you-right,
other-wrong”, or “you-wrong, other-right”). Then they would be
directed to the step of resource distribution (i.e., the UG/DG)
after 1800-2200 ms. Otherwise, for the “you-wrong, otherwrong” feedback, participants received no reward, and the
UG/DG tasks would be skipped. Participants’ reaction times
(RT) and accuracy (ACC) of the NET in three experiments can
be obtained from supplementary information (see Figure S6,
S7, S8, S9, S10 and Text S1).
The NET feedback was used to manipulate levels of
performance. Participants’ performance was better than their
partner in the “you-right, other-wrong” condition, but worse than
their partner in the “you-wrong, other-right” condition.
Unbeknownst to participants, feedback was pre-determined by
the computer and was independent of participants’ real
performance. Each kind of feedback was presented in 35
rounds except the “you-wrong, other-wrong” feedback, which
appeared in 15 rounds.
The Ultimatum Game (UG) and Dictator Game (DG). The
UG is a classical paradigm for investigating fairness [12]. In the
UG, one player (the proposer) receives an endowment and
proposes how to split the money between him/herself and the
other player (the responder), who starts with zero. The
responder is free to accept or reject the offer. Each player gets
the proposed share if the offer is accepted; whereas both
players get nothing following a rejection. The DG is similar with
the UG, except that DG responders may not reject offers, so
proposers may ignore potential rejection [8,9]. However, the
UG/DG task employed in the current study differed from the
typical UG/DG in the sense that players are randomly awarded
in the classical games, but reward used for UG/DG is earned
by players in the current study.
As described above, the UG/DG task contained 105 rounds
in which the NET feedback was not “you-wrong, other-wrong”
(90 rounds for the UG and 15 rounds for the DG). For the
participant and his/her partner in the NET, one of them would
act as the UG/DG proposer, and the other as the responder. To
avoid the potential effect of personal reputation, participants
were told that, when playing the role of UG proposer, their offer
on each round would be immediately accepted or rejected by
their partner, but they would not know their partner’s decision
until the end of the experiment [47]. Likewise, when playing the
role of the responder, the partner would not learn the
participants’ decision on each round. Participants played as UG
proposers in 15 rounds, UG responders in 75 rounds, and DG
proposers in 15 rounds. The sequence of these three types of
rounds was pseudorandom and pre-determined.
When playing as UG/DG proposers, participants were asked
to allocate the 100 MUs by pressing one of the buttons “1-9” on
the keyboard (see Figure S4). For example, pressing “6” meant
that participants kept 60 MUs for themselves and left 40 MUs
to their partner (see Figure S2).
When playing as UG/DG responders, participants were
instructed to accept or reject the offers from their “partner” by
pressing the “F” or “J” buttons, respectively, or the reverse

Experiment 1
Methods: Experiment 1
Ethics Statement. This study was completely approved by
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Beijing Normal
University. Written informed consents were collected for all
participants.
Participants. Sixty-seven college students aged 18–26
years (51 females; mean age 21.22 ± 1.84 years) participated
in Experiment 1 as paid volunteers.
Task Procedure. Participants were asked to complete the
tasks simultaneously with three other anonymous persons
sitting in different rooms with the doors closed. Participants
finished the tasks on a personal computer. Stimulus display
and behavioral data acquisition were conducted using
PsychToolbox (http://psychtoolbox.org/PTB-2/) in the Matlab
environment [41,42]. Participants were told that the computer
would randomly assign a “partner” for them from one of the
three persons at the beginning of each round. To encourage
participants to make real decisions, they were informed that the
money units (MUs) accrued during the game would increase
the bonus money received at the end of the experiment. In
reality, in order to control for partner strategy across
participants, participants were playing with a pre-programmed
computer algorithm (see also 43.
Experiment 1 contained 120 rounds in total, with 105 rounds
consisting of two steps: resource earning and resource
distribution (see also 44. Resource earning was represented in
the form of a number estimation task (NET), while resource
distribution was represented in the form of the traditional
ultimatum game (UG) and dictator game (DG). In the other 15
rounds, the stage of resource distribution was skipped (see
below).
The Number Estimation Task (NET). On each round,
fixation was first presented at the center of the screen for 1000
ms. Then participants saw a screen with 100 red dots for 100
ms. The screen was divided equally into left and right halves by
a black line. For each round, the number of red dots (100 in
total and varied between 40 and 60 in each side) was slightly
different between the left and right sides, but discriminating the
difference was visually difficult (see Figure S1). Participants
were instructed to judge which side had more dots, by pressing
“F” with left index finger to indicate that there were more dots
on the left side, and “J” with right index finger to indicate as
much on the right side (for similar game settings, see [45,46]).
After a delay of 800-1200 ms, the feedback of the NET was
presented for 2000 ms.
There were four types of feedback in the NET: “you-right,
other-right”, “you-right, other-wrong”, “you-wrong, other-right”,
and “you-wrong, other-wrong” (i.e., where “you” refers to the
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Simple-effect analysis on the interaction revealed that,
regarding the factor of Performance, the acceptance rate in the
worse-performance condition was higher than both the betterand even-performance conditions for all kinds of offers (p < .05)
except equal offers (50:50), for which the worse-performance
condition was higher than the better-performance condition (p
< .05) but showed no difference with the even-performance
condition (p > .05) (see Figure 2 and Table S2). In addition, the
difference between the better- and the even-performance
conditions was not significant for any kind of offer (p > .05).
Regarding the factor of Offer, the acceptance rate for equal
offers was higher than other kinds of offers in the better- and
even-performance conditions (p < .05) whereas no significant
difference was found between the offers 50:50, 40:60, and
30:70 in the worse-performance condition (p > .05).
Fairness Ratings. Two-way repeated measures ANOVA of
Performance (better vs. even vs. worse) by Offer (50:50 vs.
40:60 vs. 30:70 vs. 20:80 vs. 10:90) yielded significant main
effects of Performance (F(2,132) = 55.58, p < .0005) and Offer
(F(4,264) = 141.97, p < .0005) and a significant interaction
between Performance and Offer (F(8,528) = 31.36, p < .0005).
Feelings of fairness decreased as a function of levels of
performance but increased as a function of allocations to
participants. Simple-effect analysis on the interaction revealed
that for equal offers (50:50), the fairness rating was higher in
the even-performance condition than the other two conditions
(p < .05); for moderately unequal offers (40:60 and 30:70), the
rating was highest in the worse-performance condition, and
lowest in the better-performance condition (p < .05); for highly
unequal offers (20:80 and 10:90), the rating was higher in the
worse-performance condition than the other two conditions (p
< .05) (see Figure 3).

button assignments (counterbalanced across participants). In
each round, one of five potential offers would be presented:
“you-50, other-50”, “you-40, other-60”, “you-30, other-70”,
“you-20, other-80”, or “you-10, other-50”. Like the NET
feedback, the offers were actually pre-determined by the
computer (rather than by other persons) in a pseudorandom
sequence, with each kind of offer appearing in 15 rounds. After
participants made the decision, the resulting allocation would
be presented for 1000 ms (see Figure S3).
Following the formal tasks, participants were asked to rate
the levels of fairness (7-point scale) of each kind of offer. At the
end of the experiment, each participant was paid 30 Chinese
yuan (approximately five dollars) as compensation. In addition,
all participants were completely debriefed about the deception
and the experiment’s motivation.
Statistics. Three kinds of dependent variables were entered
into data analysis: (a) participants’ proposed offers in the
UG/DG proposer stage, (b) participants’ acceptance rate in the
responder stage, and (c) the results of the self-rating fairness.
For all the analyses listed below, the significance level was
set at 0.05 (two-tailed). Repeated measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA) was used for statistical analysis [34,48],
with the within-subject factors of performance (better vs. even
vs. worse) and game (UG vs. DG) for proposed offers; and
performance (better vs. even vs. worse) and offer (50:50 vs.
40:60 vs. 30:70 vs. 20:80 vs. 10:90) for acceptance rate and
subjective ratings. Greenhouse–Geisser correction for ANOVA
tests was used whenever appropriate. Post-hoc testing of
significant effects was conducted using the Bonferroni method.
Statistical analysis was performed using SPSS Statistics 16.0
(IBM, Somers, USA). Only significant effects are reported
hereafter.

Discussion: Experiment 1

Results: Experiment 1

When playing in the UG and DG, participants’ behavior was
significantly affected by their performance during resource
earning (i.e., from the NET task). If participants’ performance
was worse than their partners, they offered more generous
allocations when playing the role of UG/DG proposers, and
showed more tolerance to unequal offers when playing the role
of UG responders. In contrast, if participants’ performance was
better than their partners, they were less likely to propose an
equal offer (see also [17,44,50]). These results reveal that
individuals agree to make resource distribution according to
each party’s earned entitlement. However, the extent to which
entitlement was considered during decision-making was
motivated by self-interest, such that participants allocated more
MUs to themselves in the better-performance condition than
they allocated to their partner in the worse-performance
condition. These findings indicated that individuals are more
prone to take entitlement into consideration in the betterperformance condition than worse-performance condition.
Similarly, proposers allocated more to themselves in the DG
than in the UG. Indeed, the differences in allocation between
UG and DG have been considered as an elegant index of
strategic motivation, because the proposer does not face
potential punishment (i.e., rejection) in the DG; thus, no
strategic behavior is needed in the DG. In contrast, punishment

Resources Allocation: Proposals.
Two-way repeated
measures ANOVA of Performance (better vs. even vs. worse)
by Game (UG vs. DG) yielded significant main effects of
Performance (F(2,132) = 76.66, p < .0005) and Game (F(1,66)
= 30.23, p < .0005). Participants’ allocation to themselves was
largest in the better-performance condition (in which their
performance was better than their partner), and smallest in the
worse-performance condition (p < .05). In addition, participants
allocated themselves more MUs in the DG than in the UG (p < .
05; see Figure 1 and Table S1; see also [49]). In addition, as a
DG proposer, participants’ allocation to themselves in the
better-performance condition was larger than the MUs
participants allocated to their partner in the worse-performance
condition (t(66) = 6.67, p < .0005).
Responses to Offers: Acceptance Rate.
Two-way
repeated measures ANOVA of Performance (better vs. even
vs. worse) by Offer (50:50 vs. 40:60 vs. 30:70 vs. 20:80 vs.
10:90) yielded significant main effects of Performance
(F(2,132) = 63.01, p < .0005) and Offer (F(4,264) = 94.29, p < .
0005) and a significant interaction between Performance and
Offer (F(8,528) = 12.84, p < .0005). The acceptance rate
decreased as a function of levels of performance but increased
as a function of allocations to participants.
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Figure 1. The average points participants allocated to themselves in the UG and DG in Experiment 1. The better the
participants’ performance, the more they allocated to themselves. In addition, participants allocated more to themselves in DG than
UG Error bars indicate 1 SE. UG: ultimate game; DG: dictator game.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073106.g001

to themselves in the worse-performance condition (see Figure
1). Thus, we suggest that levels of performance also modulate
participants’ perception of fairness to unequal offers that are
advantageous to them.
Previous studies suggest that proposers avoid both
advantageous and disadvantageous unequal resources
allocation [11]. Likewise, responders reject unequal offers that
are advantageous to themselves, indicating the egalitarianism
motivation [51–54]. However, the earned entitlement was not
explicitly manipulated in these studies, so it remained unclear
whether people would consider unequal, advantageous offers
as “fair proposals” when they performed better than their
partners. In order to clarify this point, UG-responders were
exposed to both advantageous and disadvantageous offers in
the Experiment 2.

threat in the UG is likely to induce fear of rejection and
corresponding strategic motivation [40].
Regarding the subjective-rating scales, the fairness rating
decreased as a function of levels of performance, indicating
that entitlement modulated fairness judgments. The classical
“egalitarianism motivation” is also evidenced, such that the
fairness rating for the equal offer (50:50) was highest when
participants’ performance was the same as their partners.
Nevertheless, in the worse-performance condition, participants
rated 50:50 less fair than 40:60 (see Figure 3). In conclusion,
feelings of fairness reflected an integration between the
classical “egalitarianism motivation” and earned entitlement.
In Experiment 1, the most generous offer in the UG task was
50:50, and unequal offers were always disadvantageous to
participants. However, we noticed that the fairness rating in the
better-performance condition stayed at a relatively low level
even when the offer was 50:50 (see Figure 3), indicating that
when participants’ performance was better, 50:50 was not “fair
enough” to them. Indeed, when playing as proposers,
participants tended to allocate more MUs to their partners than
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Figure 2. The average acceptance rate to different kinds of offers within each performance in Experiment 1. Participants
showed enhanced tolerance to unequal offers when their performance was worse than their partners, such that the acceptance rate
was higher in the worse-performance condition compared with the better-performance and even-performance conditions in all
unequal offers. The acceptance rate did not show any difference between the even-performance condition and the betterperformance condition for any offers. Error bars indicate 1 SE.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073106.g002

Experiment 2

“you-70, other-30”, “you-50, other-50”, “you-30, other-70”, and
“you-10, other-90” (see Figure S5).

Methods: Experiment 2
Results: Experiment 2

Ethics Statement. This study was completely approved by
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Beijing Normal
University. Written informed consents were collected for all
participants.
Participants. Seventy college students aged 18–24 years
(42 females; mean age 21.59 ± 2.05 years) participated in
Experiment 2 as paid volunteers. None of these students
participated in Experiment 1.
Task Procedure. In general, the task procedure was the
same as Experiment 1, except that the potential offers to UGresponders included distributions more favorable than 50:50.
Specifically, potential offers included: “you-90, other-10”,

PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

Resources Allocation: Proposals. Two-way ANOVA of
Performance (better vs. even vs. worse) by Game (UG vs. DG)
yielded significant main effects of Performance (F(2,138) =
134.63, p < .0005) and Game (F(1,69) = 34.43, p < .0005).
Similar with Experiment 1, participants’ allocation to
themselves was largest in the better-performance condition,
and smallest in the worse-performance condition (p < .05). In
addition, participants allocated themselves more MUs in the
DG than in the UG (see Figure 4 and Table S3). In addition, as
a DG proposer, participants’ allocation to themselves in the
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Figure 3. The fairness ratings in response to different kinds of offers within each performance condition in Experiment
1. The ratings of fairness decreased as offers became more unequal and as performance became better. Error bars indicate 1 SE.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073106.g003

better-performance condition was larger than that to the partner
in the worse-performance condition (t(69) = 6.08, p < .0005).
Responses to Offers: Acceptance Rate.
Two-way
repeated measures ANOVA of Performance (better vs. even
vs. worse) by Offer (90:10 vs. 70:30 vs. 50:50 vs. 30:70 vs.
10:90) yielded significant main effects of Performance
(F(2,138) = 41.25, p < .0005) and Offer (F(4,276) = 80.24, p < .
0005) and a significant interaction between Performance and
Offer (F(8,552) = 29.17, p < .0005). The acceptance rate
decreased as a function of levels of performance but increased
as a function of allocations to participants. Simple-effect
analysis on the interaction revealed that, for 90:10
(advantageous) offers, the acceptance rate was lower in the
worse-performance condition compared with the betterperformance condition (p < .05). For disadvantageous offers
(30:70 and 10:90), the acceptance rate was highest in the
worse-performance condition, and lowest in the betterperformance condition (p < .05) (see Figure 5 and Table S4).
In addition, a paired-samples t test was performed between
acceptance rate of advantageous offers in the betterperformance condition and that of disadvantageous offers in

PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

the worse-performance condition. This comparison was aimed
to reveal whether participants strictly followed the same justice
principle for both advantageous and disadvantageous offers
[55]. The results revealed that the acceptance rate of
advantageous offers (acceptance rate in 90:10 and 70:30 were
collapsed) in the better-performance condition was higher than
that of disadvantageous offers (acceptance rate in 10:90 and
30:70 were collapsed) in the worse-performance condition
(t(69) = 4.76, p < .0005; see Figure 6).
Fairness Ratings. Two-way repeated measures ANOVA of
Performance (better vs. even vs. worse) by Offer (90:10 vs.
70:30 vs. 50:50 vs. 30:70 vs. 10:90) yielded significant main
effects of Performance (F(2,138) = 4.18, p < .05) and Offer
(F(4,276) = 39.86, p < .0005) and a significant interaction
between Performance and Offer (F(8,552) = 94.87, p < .0005).
In general, the fairness rating was higher in the worseperformance condition compared with better-performance
condition (p < .05) and was highest when the offer was 50:50
(p < .05).
Simple-effect analysis on the interaction revealed that,
regarding the factor of Performance, for advantageous offers,
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Figure 4. The average points participants allocated to themselves in the UG and DG in Experiment 2. The points that
participants allocated to themselves increased with the performance. In addition, participants allocated more to themselves in the
DG than in the UG. Error bars indicate 1 SE. UG: ultimate game; DG: dictator game.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073106.g004

the fairness rating was highest in the better-performance
condition (p < .05); for equal offers, the rating was highest in
the even-performance condition (p < .05); for disadvantageous
offers, the rating was highest in the worse-performance
condition (p < .05). Regarding the factor of Offer, in the betterperformance condition, the fairness rating was highest for
advantageous offers and lowest for disadvantageous offers (p
< .05), whereas the reverse was true in the worse-performance
condition (p < .05); in the even-performance condition, the
rating reached its peak for equal offers (p < .05) (see Figure 7).

finding suggests that earned entitlement also modulates
individuals’ responses to unequal offers even when these
offers are advantageous to them. However, responders’
acceptance rate of unequal offers was not completely
motivated by justice principles; rather, they were motivated by
self-interest. Namely, the acceptance rate of advantageous
unequal offers in the better-performance condition was higher
than that of disadvantageous unequal offers in the worseperformance condition.
Moreover, the fairness rating clearly showed the influence of
performance on feelings of fairness. When participants
performed better than their presumed partners, they rated
advantageous unequal offers as the fairest offers; when their
performance was even, equal split was judged as the fairest
offers; finally, when participants’ performance was worse than
their partners’, the fairest offers were disadvantageous unequal
offers. These results suggest that the subjective ratings of
fairness are determined by people’s sense of earned
entitlement to the resources. Provided that the entitlement is

Discussion: Experiment 2
Experiment 2 replicated the major findings of Experiment 1.
That is, participants’ allocation to their partners, as well as their
acceptance rate, decreased as levels of performance
increased. In addition, participants were more prone to reject
advantageous unequal offers (i.e., 90:10) in the worseperformance condition than better-performance condition,
indicating that such offers might be perceived “not so fair” when
participants’ performance was worse than their partners. This
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Figure 5. The average acceptance rates to different kinds of offers within each performance condition in Experiment
2. Earned entitlement modulated participants’ response to both advantageous and disadvantageous unequal offers, such that the
acceptance rate was lowest in the worse-performance condition in response to advantageous unequal offers and highest in the
worse-performance condition in response to disadvantageous unequal offers. Error bars indicate 1 SE.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073106.g005

biased between two players, fairness entails more than
equality.
In Experiment 2, the fairness ratings and the behavioral
responses to advantageous unequal offers showed distinct
patterns. Specifically, although the subjective fairness rating to
advantageous unequal offers was sensitive to levels of
performance, participants accepted most of such offers in all
performance conditions (see Figure 5). In our opinion, the
repeated task design in Experiment 2 might be associated with
this discrepancy. When participants played the role of UGresponders in multi-rounds, they might have considered not
only the fairness level of the proposal in the current trial, but
also the treatments they received in previous trials [26]. This
view is in line with recent findings that people are less likely to
conform to social norms when they see others violate a social
norm, even if it is an unrelated social norm [56,57].
Alternatively, the advantageous offers in the worseperformance condition might lead participants to assume that
offers were randomly generated rather than proposed by the

PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

opponent. This view was supported by the results that
acceptance rates were high for both advantageous and
disadvantageous unequal offers, indicating that people were
prone to accept unequal offers due perhaps to the assumption
that the opponent was not responsible for the offers (see also
[37]). These confounding factors may have generated ceiling
effects in acceptance rate (see Figure 5) and thereby
attenuated the observed effects of entitlement on behavioral
results. In order to eliminate these potential confounding
factors, we employed one-shot version of the UG task in
Experiment 3 to confirm the results of Experiments 1 and 2.

Experiment 3
Methods: Experiment 3
Ethics Statement. This study was completely approved by
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Beijing Normal
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Figure 6. The acceptance rate of advantageous offers for better performance and disadvantageous offers for worse
performance. Participants were more prone to accept advantageous offers for better performance, relative to disadvantageous
offers for worse performance. Error bars indicate 1 SE. Advant. offers in better perform: advantageous offers for better performance;
disadv. offers in worse perform: disadvantageous offers for worse performance.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073106.g006

University. Written informed consents were collected for all
participants.
Participants. Ninety college students aged 18–25 years (52
females; mean age 21.98 ± 1.93 years) participated in the
experiment as paid volunteers. None of these students
participated in Experiment 1 or 2.
Task Procedure. Participants were asked to complete the
task with another anonymous person sitting in a different room
with the door closed. In fact, no other people were playing with
the participant. Similar with above two experiments,
Experiment 3 contained a resource earning stage (the NET)
and a following resource distribution stage (the UG and DG
games).
In the first stage (see Text S2 for more information),
participants completed 100 rounds of the NET on a personal
computer. Each participant was told that he/she and his/her
partner would together get a reward of 100 points if they give
the correct answer in more than 100 rounds (in total). At the
end of the NET, the computer “calculated” each person’s

PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

performance according to their accuracy rates and reaction
times, which was then presented on the screen. In reality, the
computer randomly assigned the participants to three groups
regardless of their task performance. Accordingly, the sample
was divided into the better-performance (16 females; mean age
22.00 ± 1.93 years), the even-performance (18 females; mean
age 21.80 ± 1.90 years), and the worse-performance (18
females; mean age 22.13 ± 2.01 years) groups, each of which
consisted of 30 participants. Independent-samples t tests
revealed that these groups did not differ significantly in age (p
> .05). For the better-performance group, the feedback
presentation indicated that the participants’ contribution on the
resource earning ranged between 75% and 85%; for the evenperformance group, the contribution ranged between 45% and
55%; for the worse-performance group, the contribution ranged
between 15% and 25%.
In the second stage, participants played one-shot UG (as
proposers and responders) and DG (as proposers) by finishing
three answer sheets (see supplemental materials). Nine kinds
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Figure 7. The fairness ratings in response to different kinds of offers within each performance condition in Experiment
2. The fairness rating was highest in the better-performance condition in response to advantageous offers; was highest in the evenperformance condition in response to equal offers; and was highest in the worse-performance in response to disadvantageous
offers. Error bars indicate 1 SE.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073106.g007

of potential offers were provided on the answer sheets, such
that participants’ potential share ranged from 10 points
(“you-10, other-90”) to 90 points (“you-90, other-10”). When
playing as (UG and DG) proposers, participants made a
proposal to their partner by selecting one offer from the
options; when playing as UG responders, participants
answered whether or not they would like to accept each kind of
potential offer. This methodology, which is called the “strategy
method,” has been widely used in lab studies for its advantage
of increasing statistical power [58].
Following the formal tasks, participants were asked to rate
the perceived levels of fairness (7-point scale) of each kind of
offer. At the end of the experiment, all participants were
completely debriefed about the deception and the object of the
experiment.
Statistics. Chi-square tests were conducted to analyze
participants’ acceptance rate in the UG responder session
[58,59]. The factor of Offer was reconstructed as a three-level
factor, such that the offers 90:10, 80:20, and 70:30 were
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labeled as “advantageous unequal offers;” the offers 60:40,
50:50, and 40:60 were labeled as “equal offers;” finally, the
offers 30:70, 20:80, and 10:90 were labeled as
“disadvantageous unequal offers.”

Results: Experiment 3
Resources Allocation: Proposals. Two-way ANOVA of
Performance (better vs. even vs. worse) by Game (UG vs. DG)
yielded significant main effects of Performance (F(2,87) =
71.12, p < .0005) and Game (F(1,87) = 25.65, p < .0005). The
patterns of these main effects were the same as Experiments 1
and 2 (see Figure 8 and Table S5). In addition, as a DG
proposer, participants’ allocation to themselves in the betterperformance condition was larger than that to the partner in the
worse-performance condition (t(58) = 4.20, p < .0005).
Responses to Offers: Acceptance Rate. The acceptance
rate for advantageous unequal offers (90:10, 80:20, and 70:30)
was higher in the better-performance condition (94.44%) than
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Figure 8. The average points participants allocated to themselves in the UG and DG in Experiment 3. Participants’
allocations to themselves were highest when their performance was better than partners and lowest in the worse-performance
condition. In addition, participants allocated more to themselves in the DG than in the UG. Error bars indicate 1 SE. UG: ultimate
game; DG: dictator game.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073106.g008

performance (55.56%; χ2(1) = 36.30, p < .0005). These results
were in accordance with the findings in Experiment 2 and
implicated self-interest in the decision-making process.
Fairness Ratings. Two-way repeated measures ANOVA of
Performance (better vs. even vs. worse) by Offer
(advantageous vs. equal vs. disadvantageous) yielded
significant main effects of Offer (F(8,696) = 52.95, p < .0005)
and the interaction between Performance and Offer (F(16,696)
= 22.26, p < .0005). The fairness rating was highest for equal
offers (p < .05).
Simple-effect analysis on the interaction revealed that,
regarding the factor of Performance, for advantageous offers,
the fairness rating was highest in the better-performance
condition; for equal offers, the rating was higher in the eventhan the better-performance condition (p < .05); for
disadvantageous offers, the rating was highest in the worseperformance condition (p < .05). Regarding the factor of Offer,
in the better-performance condition, the fairness rating was

either the even- (61.11%; χ2(1) = 28.93, p < .0005) or the
worse-performance condition (70%; χ2(1) = 18.40, p < .0005).
Meanwhile, the acceptance rate for disadvantageous unequal
offers (30:70, 20:80, and 10:90) was higher in the worseperformance condition (55.56%) than either the better(13.33%; χ2(1) = 35.53, p < .0005) or the even-performance
condition (15.56%; χ2(1) = 31.42, p < .0005). In short,
participants were more likely to accept advantageous unequal
offers when they performed better than their partner, and were
more likely to accept disadvantageous unequal offers when
their performance was worse (see Figure 9 and Table S6).
Furthermore, the acceptance rate for equal offers (50:50) was
lower in the better-performance condition (63.33%) than either
the even- (86.67%; χ2(1) = 18.40, p < .0005) or the worseperformance condition (86.67%; χ2(1) = 18.40, p < .0005) (see
Text S3 for more information). Finally, the acceptance rate of
advantageous offers in the better-performance (94.44%) was
higher than that of disadvantageous offers in the worse-
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Figure 9. The average acceptance rates to different kinds of offers within each performance condition in Experiment
3. Participants were more likely to accept advantageous unequal offers when they performed better than their partner, and were
more likely to accept disadvantageous unequal offers in the worse-performance condition. Error bars indicate 1 SE. Adv. uneq:
advantageous unequal offers; dis.uneq: disadvantageous unequal offers.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073106.g009

highest
for
advantageous
offers
and
lowest
for
disadvantageous offers (p < .05); in the even-performance
condition, the rating was highest for equal offers (p < .05); in
the worse-performance condition, the rating was highest for
equal offers and lowest for advantageous offers (p < .05) (see
Figure 10).

fairness entails more than equality when levels of entitlement
are biased between two parties.

General Discussion
By providing a resource earning stage before resource
allocation, we aimed to reveal distinct motivations that
modulate individuals’ allocation as UG/DG proposers and their
response to unequal offers as UG responders. First of all, the
current study observed that earned entitlement significantly
influenced both proposers’ and responders’ decisions.
Proposers allocated more MUs to themselves and accepted
more advantageous unequal offers in the better-performance
condition than in the worse-performance condition. In
accordance with participants’ behavioral decisions, it is clear
that earned entitlement also influenced subjective feelings of
fairness. In the better-performance condition, advantageous
offers were considered as fairer proposals (see Figures 7 and
10), while in the worse-performance condition, the

Discussion: Experiment 3
Consistent with Experiments 1 and 2, the results of
Experiment 3 suggested that participants’ allocation decisions,
their responses to unequal offers, and their subjective ratings
of offers were significantly influenced by performance. Most
importantly, levels of performance modulated not only the
responses to disadvantageous unequal offers, but also the
responses to advantageous unequal offers, such that
participants were less likely to accept advantageous offers
when their performance was not better than their partners’. In
addition, they rated such offers as fairer than equal-shares in
the better-performance condition. It is therefore evidenced that
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Figure 10. The fairness ratings in response to different kinds of offers within each performance condition in Experiment
3. . The fairness rating was highest in the better-performance condition in response to advantageous offers; was highest in the
even-performance condition in response to equal offers; and was highest in the worse-performance in response to disadvantageous
offers. Error bars indicate 1 SE. Adv.uneq: advantageous unequal offers; dis.uneq: disadvantageous unequal offers.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073106.g010

Preference for Fairness

disadvantageous offers received higher fairness rating (see
Figures 3, 7, and 10). These results indicate that fairness
perception is flexible across different social contexts (see also
21,60, and preference for equitable outcomes described
fairness perceptions only in the special case where earned
entitlement between each side was the same. Furthermore,
participants’ decisions were motivated by self-interest: a) MUs
allocated to self in the DG were higher than those in the UG, b)
MUs allocated to self in the better-performance condition were
more than those to the partner in the worse-performance
condition, and c) the acceptance rate of advantageous unequal
offers for the better-performance condition was higher than that
of disadvantageous unequal offers for the worse-performance
condition. These results indicate that both preference for
fairness and self-interest serve as important factors in the
process of social decision-making. These distinct motivations
are discussed in detail in the following sections.

PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org

Fairness is a crucial social norm that individuals obey during
resource allocation. In the classical UG/DG task, “fairness” is
modeled in its simplest form: equal shares. However, recent
studies have indicated that the fairness judgment is sensitive to
contextual cues such as earned entitlement [29]. In accord with
recent evidence, the current study observed modulations of
entitlement on both resource allocation and response to
unequal offers.
Regarding participants’ decisions as UG/DG proposers, the
MUs that participants allocated to themselves increased as a
function of entitlement. These results are consistent with recent
studies employing similar manipulation of entitlement. In these
studies, it has been well demonstrated that proposers show
very little preference for equality and keep most of resources
when they have earned the entitlement [16,17,44,50,61]. More
importantly, the current results reveal that proposers’ decisions
are similar in the repeated and one-short versions of UG/DG
tasks. Therefore, the current design can be directly combined
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such as merit [63], expectation [20,64], intention [65],
competition [66], and even implicit contextual manipulations
[19]. These findings are in line with the current results and
demonstrate that people apply flexible and adaptative justice
principles to guide their decision-making in different social
contexts. In other words, individuals integrate both pure
preference for equality and social cues to form an adaptative
fairness motivation.

with neuroimaging techniques (e.g., fMRI) to investigate the
neural mechanisms underlying the effects of entitlement in
resource allocation. Numerous neuroimaging studies have
explored the neural correlates of resource allocation in the last
decade [1], but the classical UG/DG tasks have been used in
most such studies. Combining the current paradigm and
advanced neuroimaging techniques will broaden the current
literature on allocation behavior and related neural
underpinnings.
Although a large body of literature regarding distributive
justice has indicated the effects of entitlement in resources
allocation, much less attention has been devoted to whether
and how entitlement influences decisions in costly punishment.
A prevalent view in the current literature is that costly
punishment is driven by egalitarian motivation [2,62]. However,
a robust finding observed in the current study was that
participants showed enhanced tolerance to disadvantageous
offers and were less likely to reject these offers (i.e., costly
punishment) in the worse-performance condition. This result is
consistent across repeated and one-shot games and suggests
that costly punishments do not reflect a simple heuristics such
as equal shares, but rather depend on considerations of
earned entitlement.
Intriguingly, a similar pattern of the modulation of entitlement
was also observed when participants responded to the
advantageous offers: the acceptance rate of advantageous
offers was higher in the better-performance condition than in
the worse-performance condition. These findings provide
support to the idea that individuals reject unequal but favorable
offers [51–54] because people do not believe that they deserve
such offers [15].
However, it should be noted that participants accepted most
of the advantageous offers in the repeated UG, which was
inconsistent with subjective ratings of fairness and decsions in
the one-shot UG. These results may reflect that responders
frequently observed others’ violations of fairness norms in the
repeated UG (e.g., disadvantageous offers for betterperformance). People are less likely to conform to fairness
norms by rejecting favorable offers when they perceive that
others violate social norms [56,57]. Alternatively, it is possible
that the high acceptance rate of favorable offers may be due to
the unrealistic settings in Experiment 2. For instance, the
favorable unequal offers in the worse-performance condition
might lead participants to assume that these offers were not
proposed by the partner but were pre-programmed for
participants and the partner. In this case, people are prone to
accept unequal offers when they assume that the partner is not
responsible for these offers [37,55]. This issue can be avoided
by directly telling participants that offers are established by a
random device rather than proposed by the partner. This
procdeure may be a better choice when multiple rounds of
interactions are needed (see also 55.
To sum up, the perception of fairness is sensitive to the
sense of entitlement, an important contextual cue that
constitutes distributive justice [29]. These results also fit with
broader ideas of how social cues shape beliefs of fairness.
Indeed, a large body of recent literature has revealed that the
perception of fairness is subject to a variety of social cues,
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Self-interest
In addition to justice principles, self-interest also plays
important roles in social decision-making and even can
sometimes overcome fairness motivations. For instance, Civai
et al. (2012) recently reported that acceptance rates showed no
difference between advantageous and disadvantegous unequal
offers when financial proposals were other-involved [55]. In
contrast, the acceptance rate of advantegous unequal offers
was much higher than that of disadvantegous unequal offers
when fincianl proposals were self-involved, suggesting a selfserving bias.
Generally in accordance with previous studies regarding selfinterest, two types of self-centered motivations were evidenced
in the current study. The first was the stragetic motivation, such
that participants allocated less MUs to themselves in the UG
than those in the DG. These results reflect the fear of rejection
and corresponding strategic motivations in the UG [33,40]. A
recent developmental fMRI study revealed that the impulse
control capacity is necessary to implement strategies in the UG
task [40]. Another intriguing type of self-centered motivation is
the self-serving bias established by both DG proposers and UG
responders. Namely, the current findings indicate that people
emphasize contextual cues (i.e., entitlement) to a larger extent
in the better-performance condition relative to worseperformance condition. In other words, self-interest may serve
as a crucial moderator to decide the extent to which contextual
cues are biased when contextual aspects of fairness are
integrated with equal-split aspect of fairness. People’s desire to
appear fair to themselves and others may explain why people
do not simply maximize their payoffs but rather apply such a
subtle way [67,68]. This conjecture is in line with recent
findings that people use a “incompletely-honest” strategy to
balance payoffs and appearing honest [69,70].
In conclusion, the current results reveal that entitlement
modulates behavioral decisions in resource allocation as well
as subjective ratings of fairness. In this regard, fairness
principles employed in the resource allocation are beyond
egalitarian motivation. Similarly, earned entitlement also
modulates individuals’ responses to disadvantageous unequal
offers by enhancing tolerance to such offers when people
perform worse than their partners. These results indicate that
costly punishments are engaged to enforce the fairness
principles that integrate both entitlement and preference for
equality. Furthermore, the effects of entitlement also appears
when participants respond to advantageous unequal offers,
such that the acceptance rate of these offers is lower in the
worse-performance condition than in the better-performance
condition. These results suggest that advantageous offers are
rejected because people feel that they do not deserve such
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offers. Finally, self-interest also manifests, such that earned
entitlement is applied asymmetrically in a self-serving way to
increase payoffs. That is to say, people take advantage of
entitlement to act selfishly, although justice principles are
implemented to some extent.

Figure S9. The average RT and ACC in the number
estimation task in Experiment 2 when the participants
played the role of responder (error bars show 1 SE).
(TIF)
Figure S10. The RT and ACC in the number estimation
task in Experiment 3 (error bars show 1 SE).
(TIF)

Supporting Information
Figure S1. An exemplar of stimuli presentation in the
number estimation task. One hundred red dots were
presented on the screen, which was divided into equal left and
right halves by a black line. In each trial, the number of red dots
between the left and right sides always differed (i.e., varied
between 40 and 60).
(TIF)

Table S1. The mean (with SD) MUs that participants
allocated to themselves when playing the role of proposer.
(DOC)
Table S2. The mean (with SD) acceptance rate (%) in
response to each kind of offer in different performance
conditions.
(DOC)

Figure S2. Event sequence in an example trial when
participants played the role of proposer in Experiments 1
and 2. ITI: inter-trial interval.
(TIF)

Table S3. The mean (with SD) MUs that participants
allocated to themselves when playing the role of proposer.
(DOC)

Figure S3. Event sequence in an example trial when
participants played the role of responder in Experiments 1
and 2. ITI: inter-trial interval.
(TIF)

Table S4. The mean (with SD) acceptance rate (%) in
response to each kind of offer in different performance
conditions.
(DOC)

Figure S4. The proposal presentation in Experiment 1
when participants played the proposer role. There were ten
potential offers for participants to choose -90:10, 80:20, 70:30,
60:40, 50:50, 40:60, 30:70, 20:80, and 10:90. Participants were
instructed to propose offers by pressing the corresponding
button.
(TIF)

Table S5. The mean (with SD) MUs that participants
allocated to themselves when playing the role of proposer.
(DOC)
Table S6. The mean (with SD) acceptance rate (%) in
response to each kind of offer in different performance
conditions.
(DOC)

Figure S5. The proposal used in Experiment 2 when
participants played the proposer role. There were five
potential offers for participants to choose -90:10, 70:30, 50:50,
30:70, and 10:90.
(TIF)

Text S1. The instructions in Experiment 3.
(DOC)
Text S2.
Participants’ performance in the number
estimation task.
(DOC)

Figure S6. The average RT and ACC in the number
estimation task in Experiment 1 when the participants
played the role of proposer (error bars indicate 1 SE).
(TIF)

Text S3. Statistical analysis on accept rates of each offer
in Experiment 3.
(DOC)

Figure S7. The average RT and ACC in the number
estimation task in Experiment 1 when the participants
played the role of responder (error bars indicate 1 SE).
(TIF)
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